Iranian Arms Shipment Routes to Houthis Revealed by Large Seizure

The methods being used by the Iranians to smuggle arms to the Houthis were revealed in a report issued by Yemen’s National Resistance Forces (NRF). The troops loyal to the internationally recognized government describe the smuggling routes that Iran has traditionally used to ship military material to the Houthis.

The report is based on statements made by the crew of the dhow Al Sharwa, which was intercepted at sea by the NRF in July. The seizure included a mixed 750-ton cargo of arms, ammunition, missiles, and components.

It is generally assumed that the crews of stateless dhows intercepted with arms on board are crewed by similarly stateless crews, often ethnic Baluchis with no political character. However, in this instance, four of the crew appear to have been Houthi affiliates, who had travelled to Iran with many others to be trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in military camps known to be run by the IRGC Qods Force and dedicated to the training of foreign proxies.

The four crew members trained by the IRGC Qods Force described three main routes used by the IRGC to smuggle weapons and material to the Houthis.

The seized dhow was packed full of arms from Iran (CENTCOM)

The first “front door” route involved using overt use of commercial shipping from Bandar Abbas, unloading at the port of Salif. This route has been disrupted of late by Israeli and U.S. air strikes. This route was usually employed when transporting dangerous cargo such as binary or unstable rocket fuels that need to be handled delicately or kept refrigerated.

The second route entailed the use of a mother ship anchored off Somalia, from which cargos were craned onto local Yemeni fishing boats hired to take the cargos into smaller fishing ports on the coast controlled by the Houthis in Yemen. This testimony is believed to be a reference to the IRGC ships, which used to be stationed off Eritrea’s Dahlak Bank in the lower Red Sea, albeit both were registered as being owned by the state-owned but sanctioned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line Group (IRISL). The MV Saviz (IMO: 9167253) was damaged by an unattributed limpet mine attack on April 6, 2021. She was replaced by an identical sister ship, the MV Behshad (IMO: 9167289), in July 2021, which remained on station until she moved - presumably fearing another limpet mine attack - to take up a new station in the Gulf of Aden off Djibouti in January 2024.

The third route involved the IRGC using front companies to ship material using normal commercial channels to Djibouti. From Djibouti, the material was forwarded using smaller local dhows to Hodeidah and Salif, again using false consignment papers and the connivance of corrupt officials in Djibouti.

Some of the material seized in the July 2025 capture of the dhow (CENTCOM)

The four crew members appear to have provided the NRF - and then presumably the UAE and other allies - with a comprehensive breakdown of the smuggling network. This likely includes the names and formal positions of the IRGC Qods Force and Houthi officers in charge at each end of the network, plus the corrupt dockside officials involved and the logistic locations used.

All three of these traditional routes have now been heavily disrupted. But an attribute of IRGC Qods Force operations has been adaptability. It can be assumed, therefore, that new smuggling routes are being devised - but given disruption to IRGC Qods Force operations of late, this may prove time-consuming and difficult.